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 Once upon a time in the 1950s, a new electronic medium graced the United 
States—cable television.  It raised a recurring question in U.S. media and 
telecommunications policy: when a new medium impacts public service, other 
telecommunications industries, public safety, and the like, how, if at all, should the 
federal government regulate it?  Although some issues are inherently local, most 
electronic communications raise national concerns as to economic or technological 
matters.1  Unfortunately, neither Congress nor the Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC”),2 the government’s chosen regulatory agent, has a particularly 
outstanding track record in dealing with new media.  
 Both are faced with yet another impending issue, which has created more heat 
than light in the last few years: the slow but ongoing development of FIOS and 
Lightspeed (for convenience referred to as FIOS/Lightspeed in this piece) by Verizon 
and AT&T, respectively, the two largest telecommunications companies in the 
United States.3  FIOS/Lightspeed seems locked into a regulatory regime very similar 
to that of cable in its first three decades.  The history of cable regulation provides 
lessons for the regulation of successor technologies such as FIOS/Lightspeed.  
 Although the technological and economic infrastructure of FIOS/Lightspeed is 
quite different from cable, this technology raises a number of the same regulatory 
issues that were hashed out by the FCC, Congress, and the courts fifty years ago.  It 
thus may be useful to look at cable’s federal regulatory history in order to shed some 
light on prospective regulatory schemes for FIOS/Lightspeed.  But first, it is 
important to understand the technologies of cable and FIOS/Lightspeed, which are 
quite different.
II. TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICS OF CABLE AND FIOS/LIGHTSPEED
 Although both cable and FIOS/Lightspeed have high bandwidth compared to 
terrestrial broadcast television—i.e., more than 100 full-motion video color channels, 
as well as interactive voice and data applications—their economic underpinnings are 
somewhat different.  Cable generally charges by the tier of channels (e.g., “basic,” 
and “expanded basic”), while FIOS/Lightspeed uses per-program or per-use fees. 
1. For a delineation of issues with apparently inherent national characteristics, see discussion infra pp. 
1044–45.
2. The FCC, established by the Communications Act of 1934, is an independent federal agency that 
regulates radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable communications.  See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).  See 
generally About the Federal Communication Commission, http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2008).
3. FIOS and Lightspeed are fiber optic services that represent the next generation of technology used to 
provide television, Internet, and telephone services to customers at increasingly high speeds with greater 
capacity.  Each of these uses a slightly different version of fiber to the home (“FTTH”) to deliver two-
way, high-speed broadband services to homes and businesses.  AT&T executives claim that Lightspeed 
can be made fully compatible with FIOS.  However, when pressed for an engineering explanation, their 
responses are somewhat vague.  The consumer service from AT&T often is termed “U-verse.”  AT&T 
describes Lightspeed as the infrastructure and U-verse as the content.  Confidential Interview with 
AT&T executive, in N.Y., N.Y. (Oct. 16, 2008).  The distinction, however, is sometimes less than 
clear.  
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Further, their technological capabilities differ significantly, with varying abilities to 
provide high-speed Internet and voice telephony.  Nevertheless, both are multi-
channel video, voice, and data providers.  Thus, to an as yet unknown extent, they 
may compete directly with each other.  They may also compete with direct broadcast 
satellites (“DBS”)—such as DirectTV and Echostar—that can deliver hundreds of 
high-quality digital signals to terrestrial users from platforms 22,300 miles in space; 
but which lack any interactive capability, thus making the provision of Internet or 
voice telephony services impossible.4 
 Both cable and fiber optics can deliver a hundred or more channels of programming 
with varying degrees of interactive or two-way capacity, but they operate in radically 
different ways.  Cable uses essentially the same radio frequency transmission 
technology as broadcast television, except that it distributes signals through coaxial 
cable as well as through light-based fiber optic material, rather than over the air. 
The basic plant is the same, whether the system distributes analog or digital signals, 
or both.  The main limitation on a cable system’s bandwidth is not so much the cable 
as the associated electronics, such as amplifiers and switchers.  Precisely for this 
reason cable operators are incorporating increasing amounts of fiber optics into their 
systems.
 A cable plant uses a “tree and branch” architecture in which signals move 
“downstream” from a central “headend” to subscribers through a series of cables.  It 
thus resembles many traditional public utilities, such as water, gas, or electricity.5 
Although some cable systems are adding small switches, unlike traditional telephone 
companies they cannot connect subscribers directly with third parties for two-way or 
interactive services.6  To the extent that cable operators provide telephony or Internet 
services, they generally do so through direct cable modem connections to Internet 
service providers (“ISPs”), rather than through their own systems.  Therefore, cable 
systems are not interactive in the same sense as local or long distance telephone 
carriers.
 FIOS/Lightspeed uses fiber optics for virtually all wiring, other than the “last 
mile” to a home or business.7  Though both Verizon and AT&T are extraordinarily 
secretive about their technology, some information about their architecture is known. 
4. But c.f. Press Release, Hicks Holdings, LLC, Hicks Holdings Forms New Venture, DIRECTPATH, to 
Provide DirectTV, Broadband, Other Services to Multiple Dwelling Unit Market (May 2, 2006), http://
phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=127160&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=851360&highlight 
(announcing that its new company “will help drive the efficient deployment of the full suite of DirectTV 
content plus such advanced service offerings as HDTV, digital video recording (DVR), [and] interactive 
services”).  Despite asserting that it has a solution to provide two-way capacity, so far DirectTV has not 
adopted any detailed plan. 
5. Michael Botein, Regulation of The Electronic Mass Media: Law and Policy for Radio, 
Television, Cable and the New Video Technologies 6 (3d ed. 1998).
6. Id.
7. See Robert Crandall, J. Gregory Sidak & Hal Singer, Does Video Delivered over a Telephone Network 
Require a Cable Franchise, 59 Fed. Comm. L.J. 251, 253–55 (2007).
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FIOS runs fiber optics directly to the user while Lightspeed uses copper wire.8  Thus, 
FIOS somewhat resembles cable’s tree and branch architecture; downstream signals 
are ubiquitous to all subscribers within the same service tier.  The similarity is 
relatively minor, however, because FIOS is a fully interactive system, unlike most 
cable systems.  Lightspeed, on the other hand, seems to provide one signal at a time 
through a “video on demand” basis, presumably making it, unlike FIOS, an Internet 
Protocol-driven system.9  This distinction, however, does not prevent FIOS 
subscribers from using the system to access the Internet to send and receive video, 
voice, or data. 
 FIOS and Lightspeed thus are significantly different not only from cable, but 
also from each other, if only because of Lightspeed’s use of Internet Protocol to 
provide switching and addressing functions.10  Neither service is technologically 
compatible with cable, and it is doubtful whether they could be compatible with each 
other.  Lightspeed officials claim that on a very basic transmission level the two 
systems theoretically could interconnect because both are digital.11  As is so common 
in this area, however, there is no publicly available engineering data to support this 
proposition because of the intense secrecy surrounding these technologies.  Thus, the 
legal regime may be dealing with three technologically distinct and incompatible 
multi-channel approaches: cable, FIOS, and Lightspeed—and potentially a fourth 
approach, DBS.
 DBS poses fewer jurisdictional issues than FIOS/Lightspeed since its use of 
over-the-air frequencies clearly brings it within the definition of broadcasting.12  If 
DBS develops the capacity to interconnect users, it obviously would be more akin to 
other multi-channel providers in regulatory terms.
III. FEDERAL CABLE REGULATION
 A. Rationales for Federal, State, and Local Regulation
 All media are not created equal, and some require no federal presence.  For 
example, there naturally is an interest in ensuring that newspapers do not litter or 
employ drunk drivers when delivering their wares.  But this certainly falls within the 
traditional public safety functions of local governments.  The idea of federally 
licensing delivery trucks and drivers presumably would be objectionable to most 
observers.
 Terrestrial broadcast stations also are subject to local governmental jurisdiction 
in a number of respects: for example, requiring permission to use public property or 
adhering to zoning requirements.  They also require some type of federal coordination 
8. Id.
9. See AT&T U-Verse, Internet Protocol (IP) Video Distribution Advantages, http://www.att.com/
Uverse/files/IPVideoDistribution_2-22.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2008). 
10. See id. 
11. Confidential Interview with AT&T executive, in N.Y., N.Y. (Apr. 5, 2008). 
12. See Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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since their frequencies cross local and often state boundaries, thus potentially causing 
interference that only a national entity can prevent.13  Even Professor Coase’s classic 
marketplace regulation theorem recognizes that some national body must allocate 
frequencies in order to prevent electrical interference.14
 With cable—and potentially FIOS/Lightspeed—the jurisdictional situation is 
not so clear.  Many aspects of their operations are solely within the local jurisdiction 
of cities, particularly those involving the use of public property for road or curb cuts 
to lay cable.  At the same time, some of their operations raise substantial federal 
issues even beyond the electrical interference potentially caused by terrestrial 
broadcasters.  These involve both technological and economic considerations, very 
often combined with a healthy dose of competition policy.  A few examples include: 
(i) public safety considerations, such as emergency communications;15 (ii) interesting 
and informative programming for a national audience; (iii) intermodal competition 
and its effect upon consumers, such as potential cable-FIOS/Lightspeed on a national 
basis;16 (iv) policies to ensure that FIOS/Lightspeed carries local terrestrial broadcast 
signals in order to allow, or at least prolong, its economic viability; (v) requirements 
that media do not prevent other operators from buying attractive programming;17 
and (vi) equal treatment of content providers by the Internet, in terms of bandwidth, 
delivery, etc.—so-called “network neutrality.”18
 At least some characteristics of cable seem to require national and hence federal 
regulation.  This is not to suggest that, historically, the only appropriate authority to 
deal with federal interests in cable has been the FCC.  Congress obviously could 
have created a completely new agency or given cable jurisdiction to an existing body, 
such as the Federal Trade Commission.  Indeed, Congress initially gave power over 
13. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387–88 (1969) (“When two people converse face to face, 
both should not speak at once if either is to be clearly understood. . . . But the . . . problem of interference 
is a massive reality.”).
14. Ronald Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & Econ. 1, 25 (1959).
15. The FCC recently went through a complicated and complex process in setting aside frequencies for 
public safety providers (e.g., police, fire, and medical) in newly free portions of the 700 Mhz band.  In 
the Matter of Service Rules for 698–746, 747–762, and 777–792 MHz Bands, Third Further Notice of 
Rulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 14301 (explaining the process toward “achieving the goal of a nationwide 
interoperable broadband wireless network for public safety entities”); see also Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 
Revised 700 MHz Plan for Commercial Services, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/
bandplans/700MHzBandPlan.pdf.
16. FIOS/Lightspeed also competes with a host of other print and electronic media.  For example, it 
presumably takes away some number of magazine or newspaper readers—in a time of declining print 
media revenues—as well as audiences for terrestrial television, DBS, and cable.  See generally Crandall, 
Sidak & Singer, supra note 7, at 261–62 (discussing multi-channel competitors).
17. This prohibition, preventing other operators from purchasing attractive programming, already applies 
to cable.  47 U.S.C. § 548(b) (2006).
18. See Robert Hahn & Scott Wallsten, The Economics of Network Neutrality, The Economists’ Voice, 
Apr. 2006, at 1, http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol3/iss6/art8/; Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband 
Discrimination, 2 J. Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 141 (2003) (explaining the conf lict surrounding 
network neutrality as it applies to the “open access” debate).
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interstate telephone companies to the now-terminated Interstate Commerce 
Commission, even though its only experience was with railroad carriers.  This had 
the obvious drawback of creating different agencies with power over similar media, 
which would have been increasingly aggravated with the later emergence of new 
related or competitive technologies.
 B. Overview of Cable Regulation: “Reasonably Ancillary” Jurisdiction
 The FCC initially was slow to intervene in cable regulation.  By the late 1950s, 
broadcasters were sufficiently concerned about the potential development of cable—
even though it had less than one million subscribers, which FIOS and Lightspeed 
each now claim to have—and requested that the FCC regulate it.  The FCC reaction 
was negative; in a 1959 case and rulemaking, the FCC concluded that cable did not 
represent a significant threat to “free” terrestrial broadcasting.  In a decision that 
would come back to haunt it, the FCC held that it might not have jurisdiction over 
cable, since cable was neither a common carrier nor a broadcaster.19  At that time, the 
Communications Act only covered carriers and broadcasters, thus leaving no 
independent jurisdictional basis for cable.20
 The FCC’s reaction to the new technology was not unusual.  When confronted 
with a new and unknown medium, its first strategy has often been just to ignore 
it—as it subsequently has done with the Internet and FIOS/Lightspeed.  In some 
respects, its behavior resembles the Kubler-Ross model of dealing with grief, which 
begins with denial and ends in acceptance.21
 By the beginning of the 1960s, the FCC was left with a medium which called for 
federal, state, and local regulation of its components—what became generally known 
as concurrent jurisdiction.  This was not a new situation for the agency; it had been 
dealing with state public service commissions for years in separately regulating 
interstate and intrastate aspects of telephone companies.  In situations involving both, 
the FCC and state authorities have convened “ joint boards” under the Communications 
Act. 
 During the next few years, the FCC slowly began to regulate cable.  The FCC 
limited a cable operator in carrying “distant” television signals from other areas by 
prohibiting a microwave common carrier from delivering the signals; it based its 
jurisdiction not on the cable system’s status, but on its licensing authority over the 
19. Frontier Broad. Co., 24 F.C.C. 2d 251 (1958), reconsideration denied, 26 F.C.C. 2d 403 (1959).  In holding 
that CATV systems are not under the jurisdiction of the Communications Act, the FCC implicitly held 
that CATV broadcasters were not responsible for the “economic plight” of local television stations.  Id. 
at 253–56.
20. See Cable Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 2779 (1992) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 609 (2006)) (beginning the 
creation of a comprehensive statutory framework for cable).  
21. Elisabeth Kubler-Ross & David Kessler, On Grief and Grieving: Finding the Meaning of 
Grief Through the Five Stages of Loss 7 (Simon & Schuster 2005).  The stages are: denial, anger, 
bargaining, depression, and acceptance.  Id.  Some aspects of all five stages may be present in regulatory 
agencies’ treatment of new challenges.
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common carrier.22  Technically, the FCC was regulating the microwave carrier, rather 
than the cable operator.  However, its rationale was potentially economically harmful 
for cable operators.  As the FCC recognized, this was an indirect form of regulation. 
It later imposed a comprehensive set of signal regulations on all cable systems 
receiving signals via microwave.23
 This left the FCC’s glass only half full, however, since at that time only large 
cable systems used microwave carriers.  As a result, it had jurisdiction over only part 
of the industry.  In 1966 it nevertheless adopted a comprehensive set of rules applicable 
to all systems, setting the stage for ten years worth of litigation and three trips to the 
Supreme Court regarding its jurisdiction over cable.24
 In 1968 the Court held that cable might be neither common carriage nor 
broadcasting, but that the FCC had jurisdiction over it for actions “reasonably 
ancillary to its authority over broadcasting.”25  United States v. Southwestern Cable Co. 
involved a California cable system’s attempt to “import” an out-of-market broadcast 
television signal.  The FCC had adopted a highly difficult set of full-blown 
evidentiary hearings at which a cable operator had to prove that a signal’s importation 
would not harm local television stations.  The petitioner, Southwestern, sought to 
avoid the hearing requirement.  The Court accepted that cable was not subject to any 
express provision of the Communications Act but recognized that the FCC’s 
authority under section 152(a) of the Act did not preclude it from issuing “such rules 
and regulations . . . not inconsistent with law.”26  This seems like purely housekeeping 
language to implement the substantive provisions as to carriers, broadcasters, and 
other electronic media.  In highly ambiguous terms, the Court held: 
It is enough to emphasize that the authority which we recognize today under 
Section 152(a) is restricted to that reasonably ancillary to the effective 
performance of the Commission’s various responsibilities for the regulation of 
television broadcasting. . . .  We express no views as to the Commission’s 
authority, if any, to regulate CATV under any other circumstances or for any 
other purposes.27
 The circumstances suggest that the Court did not intend to create plenary FCC 
jurisdiction over cable.  Instead, it may only have been looking for a simple way out 
22. See Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 
951 (1963).
23. Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683 (Apr. 22, 1965) (First Report and Order).
24. CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (Mar. 4, 1966) (Second Report and Order). 
25. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).  The point at issue was whether under the 1966 
Second Report and Order cable systems were required to obtain prior FCC approval—after an 
evidentiary hearing—to bring in a “distant” broadcast signal from another television service market.  Id. 
at 159 n.1.
26. Id. at 178 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 303(r)); see also 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2006) (defining the FCC’s duties and 
power to include “mak[ing] such rules and regulations . . . not inconsistent with [the Communications 
Act], as may be necessary in the execution of its functions”).
27. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 178.
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of the Communications Act’s inadequacies and Congress’s failure to act for over a 
decade.  Indeed, the Court very well may have seen Southwestern as a one-off case, 
and thought that it would not need to deal with the issue again—which soon proved 
to be an incorrect assumption.  In any event, the operative language, as well as the 
issue involved, seems to suggest that the Court viewed this case as a turf battle 
between broadcasters and cable operators, with few other ramifications.
 Within four years, the ancillary jurisdiction issue was back before the Court, 
forcing it to deal with Southwestern’s ambiguous “other circumstances” and “other 
purposes” language.  In United States v. Midwest Video Corp. (“Midwest I”), a cable 
operator challenged the FCC’s “program-origination” rule that required cable systems 
to operate, “to a significant extent,” as a local outlet through programming a channel 
with local news and public affairs.28  The FCC had adopted rules requiring large 
cable systems to provide a channel of “public service” type programming to their 
local communities.29  Unlike later rules, this rule gave cable operators complete 
content control.  In a plurality decision, the Court ultimately upheld the rule under 
Southwestern’s reasonably ancillary analysis;30 Chief Justice Burger concurred in the 
result and noted that the rule “strain[ed] the outer limits” of the agency’s authority.31 
 The Court heard what might have been the last reasonably ancillary case in 1979 
in FCC v. Midwest Video Corporation (“Midwest II”), a rematch between the Midwest 
I parties.32  In this case, the operator challenged the FCC’s replacement of the 
program-origination rule with “access” requirements for public, education, and 
governmental (“PEG”) and leased channels.33
 Whether Midwest II actually involved the reasonably ancillary doctrine is less 
than clear.  Although a majority invalidated the access requirements, the Court 
seemed to acknowledge the existence of jurisdiction but held that such jurisdiction 
could not apply to the access channel rules.  The majority claimed that the 
requirements essentially turned cable operators into common carriers by requiring 
them to carry third parties’ material without any content control.34  
 This may have been somewhat questionable for several reasons.  First, section 
153(10) of the Communications Act provides that “a person engaged in . . . broadcasting 
shall not . . . be deemed a common carrier.”35  Twenty years before, Carter Mountain 
Transmission Corp. v. FCC established that cable operators were not broadcasters, and 
28. 406 U.S. 649, 657 (1972).
29. Id. at 653–55.
30. Id. at 669–70.  
31. Id. at 676 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
32. 440 U.S. 689 (1979). 
33. In the interest of full disclosure, it should be noted that the author represented the intervener, the 
American Civil Liberties Union, in these proceedings.
34. Midwest II, 440 U.S. at 701. 
35. 47 U.S.C. § 153(10) (2006) (emphasis added).  
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thus they could not be subject to the same protections as broadcasters.36  Second, the 
access channel rules required operators to make only a limited amount of bandwidth 
available, and only to entities with public service agendas—schools, local governments, 
clubs, churches, and the like.  This regulatory regime was significantly different 
from traditional common carrier regulation, which required an operator to make all 
of its capacity available to anyone able to pay the established rate.  Finally, since the 
Court emphasized that cable systems were neither broadcasters nor common carriers, 
the decision may have been based more on an ultra vires theory than on either 
traditional common carrier regulation or reasonably ancillary jurisdiction.
 Even in the short run, the actual rationale may have been less than important.  In 
the 1984 Cable Act, Congress mooted the whole debate by giving power over access 
channel requirements to state and local governments, thus making section 153(10) of 
the Communications Act, relating to the federal requirements, totally irrelevant.37 
Because FIOS/Lightspeed includes a broad-based constituency, a legislative resolution 
very well may be far more preferable than a joint agency-court result that would 
occur under cases like Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.38
 Though Congress has resolved the issues involved in these cable regulation cases, 
a question remains as to whether the reasonably ancillary doctrine still has any 
juridical existence, and, if so, whether it might apply to other media.  Surprisingly 
enough, there still may be some life in the old rationale.  In a relatively recent 
decision, the Supreme Court was faced with deciding whether cable modems provided 
“telecommunications services,” thus making them subject to common carrier types of 
obligations.39  In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Services, the Court upheld the FCC’s declaratory ruling that cable modems—through 
ISPs—offered “information” rather than “telecommunications” services.40  This 
effectively immunized them from regulation as common carriers.
 The opinion is somewhat opaque, with a running debate between Justice Thomas 
in the majority and Justice Scalia in dissent framing arguments based on examples of 
how to characterize the functions of pizza deliveries and dog leashes.  One of the 
majority’s arguments is that the FCC may impose some carrier-type obligations on 
non-telecommunications services41—almost precisely the position rejected by the 
36. See Carter Mountain, 321 F.2d 359.
37. 47 U.S.C. § 556 (2006) (relating to coordination of federal, state, and local authority). 
38. See 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984).  Perhaps the most inf luential case in modern U.S. administrative law, 
Chevron holds, in relevant part, that judicial review of administrative action is a two-step process: (1) 
whether Congress’s intent is clear in the relevant enabling statute, and (2) if not, whether the agency’s 
interpretation of the statute is reasonable.  Id. at 842–44.
39. Nat’ l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
40. Id. at 977–78.  The Court held that Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals erred in refusing to apply Chevron, 
id. at 984, and went further to note that the FCC’s construction passed both steps in the Chevron two-
step analysis, id. at 997.
41. Id. at 996–97.
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Court in Midwest II in 1979.42  Indeed, at one point Justice Thomas, in dicta, notes 
that “the Commission remains free to impose special regulatory duties on facilities-
based ISPs under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction.”43
 Whether Title I ancillary jurisdiction is still viable has yet to be seen.  But fifty 
years of experience with it through cable regulation may provide some useful lessons 
for FIOS/Lightspeed regulation.  
IV. LESSONS FOR FIOS/LIGHTSPEED
 At present, it is less than clear how many customers subscribe to either FIOS or 
Lightspeed.  Each predicted subscription rates exceeding a million as of the end of 
2008.44  But some observers saw a much larger difference and predicted more than a 
million FIOS subscribers in 2008 and a few hundred thousand for Lightspeed.45 
Moreover, the capital expenditures appear to be extremely high—somewhere in the 
range of $4000 per subscriber—making it less than clear whether these systems will 
ever be profitable.46
 Regardless of accuracy, this range is very close to the number of cable subscribers 
in 1959, when broadcasters first asked the FCC to regulate cable television.47  This 
raises the question as to whether, at this point, there is any need for federal regulation 
of FIOS/Lightspeed.  Since the FCC took ten years to establish its jurisdiction over 
cable in Southwestern,48 and Congress another fifteen to pass the first cable 
legislation,49 a need to rush to federal intervention may be less than clear.  In any 
event, at this point, there is no clear basis for federal jurisdiction.
 As with the history of cable regulation, the first question under Chevron is 
whether there is any clear congressional mandate in the area.50  When FIOS/
Lightspeed first debuted in the middle of the decade, a number of observers—
42. Midwest II, 440 U.S. at 709.
43. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 996 (emphasis added).
44. See Todd Spangler, Charge of the Light Brigade, Multichannel News, July 21, 2008, at 12 [hereinafter 
Spangler, Charge of the Light Brigade]; Todd Spangler, U-Verse TV: Half Million Served, Multichannel 
News, July 28, 2008, at 10.
45. See Joe Savage, Managing Director, Telecom ThinkTank Inc., Presentation at the GLGi Seminar: 
Lightspeed vs. FiOS 15 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www.glgroup.com/Council-Events/GLGi-
-Lightspeed-vs.-FiOS-2552118.html (follow “Supporting Materials Download PowerPoint” hyperlink). 
Actual 2008 data is not yet available.
46. Saul Hansell, A Smart Bet or a Big Mistake?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 2008, at C1; Spangler, Charge of the 
Light Brigade, supra note 44; see also Michael Botein, The Demise of the Information Superhighway, 2 
Media L. & Pol’y 85, 88 (2003) (providing data on DSL costs, which are comparable to FIOS).
47. Thomas R. Eisenmann, Cable TV: From Community Antennas to Wired Cities, Harv. Bus. Sch. Working 
Knowledge, July 10, 2000, http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/1591.html (putting the number of cable 
subscribers at 150,000 in 1955).
48. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
49. Cable Communications Act of 1984, § 601, 98 Stat. 730 (1984) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 532 
(2006)); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 38. 
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particularly potential competitors—rushed to conclude that FIOS/Lightspeed was 
another form of cable.  The argument was that the new services were just an 
alternative delivery mechanism for multi-channel programming, and thus could and 
should be regulated under the cable provisions in Title VI of the Communications 
Act.51
 But this interpretation goes against the clear language of section 522(7) of the 
Communications Act, which defines “cable system” as a facility providing “cable 
service” and includes “video programming to multiple subscribers within a 
community.”52  On its face, this encompasses at least some FIOS/Lightspeed 
functions since they do provide video programming to local subscribers.  It does not 
give any weight, however, to the statute’s use of the phrase “cable service,” which is a 
defined term.  Under section 522(6), cable service means: “(A) the one-way 
transmission to subscribers of (i) video programming, or (ii) other programming 
service, and (B) subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the selection or 
use of such video programming or other programming service.”53  FIOS/Lightspeed 
service clearly includes one-way video programming and two-way interactive 
programming.54  But it also offers a host of other two-way services, such as voice or 
video telephony, high-speed Internet access, and enhanced control of video reception. 
It thus seems to go far beyond the contemplation of the 1996 amendments to the 
Communications Act.55  But this is less than surprising since, in 1996, the most 
advanced cable systems offered a large number of downstream channels and limited 
interaction for video-on-demand.  Thus, there was no reason for the drafters to 
anticipate the advent of technologies like FIOS/Lightspeed.
 After this brief initial enthusiasm for treating FIOS/Lightspeed as cable, it 
became clear that some other jurisdictional basis for its regulation would be necessary. 
Indeed, a number of bills quickly surfaced in Congress to give the FCC jurisdiction 
over FIOS/Lightspeed including a national franchising bill for both cable and FIOS/
Lightspeed, which the House passed in 2006.56
 There is, however, another obvious possible approach based on fifty years of 
cable regulatory history: reasonably ancillary jurisdiction.  For reasons which still are 
somewhat unclear, there was no attempt to invoke this, even after Brand X seemed to 
51. 47 U.S.C. § 609 (2006); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
52. 47 U.S.C. § 522(7) (2006).
53. 47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (2006) (emphasis added).
54. See Crandall, Sidak & Singer, supra note 7, at 279–81 (explaining how Lightspeed utilizes both one-way 
cable transmission and two-way interactive cable capabilities).
55. Id. at 280; see also 47 U.S.C. § 571 (2006).  
56. See Communications Opportunity, Promotion, and Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R. 5252, 109th Cong. 
§ 630 (2006) (as referred to Senate).  This bill did not move out of the Senate and, in fact, the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation amended the bill and removed all language 
relating to national franchises.  See Advanced Telecommunications and Opportunities Reform Act, 
H.R. 5252, 109th Cong. (2006).
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acknowledge its continued existence in 2005.57  Whether it would have been viable, 
however, is less than clear.
 As will be remembered, the basic reasoning behind the Southwestern Court’s 
invocation of reasonably ancillary jurisdiction was to prevent cable from adversely 
impacting “free” terrestrial broadcast television by attracting viewers and hence 
advertising dollars.58  The conventional wisdom was that this would deprive many 
viewers of any television service since they would not be able to afford cable 
subscriptions—which then were about six dollars per month.  The validity of this 
rationale seems somewhat questionable in hindsight since, in 2008, basic cable 
subscribership exceeded 64 million59 and DBS subscribership exceeded 17 million,60 
thus leaving terrestrial broadcasting as a very minor player.  Moreover, today’s law 
and economics approach, as derived from the Coase theorem, presumably would 
frown upon government suppression of competition to preserve public service.61  The 
FCC may have been right in predicting cable’s popularity—referring to its “explosive 
growth” as early as 1966—but it was wrong in foreseeing how many viewers would 
be willing to pay for it.
 The Southwestern Court was quite clear, however, that reasonably ancillary 
jurisdiction was a protectionist measure, pure and simple.  It “emphasize[d]” that the 
FCC’s jurisdiction covered only the “effective performance of the Commission’s 
responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting.”62  And as indicated by the 
1970s Midwest Video cases, the Court had little sympathy for the FCC’s later efforts 
to achieve social policy goals unrelated to broadcast protectionism, such as program-
origination and access channels.63
 Under a close reading, reasonably ancillary jurisdiction seems to apply only to the 
protection of the terrestrial broadcasting industry—with the possible exception of 
57. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 975–76.
58. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 174–78.
59. National Cable & Telecommunications Association Statistics, http://www.ncta.com/Statistic/Statistic/
Statistics.aspx (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).  As of June 2008, with 64.7 million subscribers, cable was 
present in 57.1% of households.  Id.
60. Press Release, DIRECTV Group, Inc., The DIRECTV Group Announces Second Quarter 2008 
Results (Aug. 7, 2008), available at http://dtv.client.shareholder.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=326924 
(placing subscribership at 17.2 million, a 6% increase from 2007); see also U.S. Gov’t Accountability 
Office, GAO-05-257, Telecommunications (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/highlights/
d05257high.pdf (providing overall data on DBS growth rate).  In January 2004, total DBS subscribership 
was 21.4 million, making DBS present in 17.4% of households.  Id. at 6.
61. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
62. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 178 (emphasis added).
63. Midwest II, 440 U.S. at 701 (invalidating access requirements for PEG and leased channels); Midwest I, 
406 U.S. at 676 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (noting that the FCC’s program-origination rule “strains the 
outer limits of even the open-ended and pervasive jurisdiction” granted to the Commission); see also 
discussion supra p. 1048. 
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the one-liner throw-away in Brand X.64  But this is largely a moot subject today since 
Congress has not only codified the signal carriage rules at issue in Southwestern, but 
has also authorized cable carriage of both local and distant broadcast signals.65
 These provisions naturally do not apply to FIOS/Lightspeed since they are not 
“cable systems.”66  But there is a more important question: What would regulation of 
FIOS/Lightspeed be reasonably ancillary to?  Even the broadcasting industry does 
not claim that FIOS/Lightspeed would have any adverse impact on it.  And it is hard 
to imagine any competitive injury, since FIOS and particularly Lightspeed mainly 
sell premium programming, telephony, and Internet services—rather than advertiser-
supported programming. 
 Ironically enough, the medium potentially most affected by FIOS/Lightspeed is 
cable.  Both historically and legally, however, it seems a bit bizarre to invoke 
reasonably ancillary jurisdiction to protect the industry which the doctrine was 
originally created to limit.  In terms of both precedent and practicality, it is unlikely 
that the reasonably ancillary doctrine is a viable jurisdictional basis for regulating 
FIOS/Lightspeed.
 This seems to put any federal presence in this area on a typical Chevron basis.67 
Until Congress legislates to establish some form of federal jurisdiction, the FCC 
seems unlikely to have any rationale for taking any action—which may suit its 
preference for denial.
 This does not, however, leave FIOS/Lightspeed free from all regulation.  Just as 
with the proto-history of cable, state and local governments have been quick to step 
in for several reasons.  First, they clearly have authority to regulate the use of public 
property, which naturally includes streets and other rights of way.  At the same time 
that the Supreme Court was creating reasonably ancillary jurisdiction for the FCC, 
it upheld, in a memorandum decision, the power of states and cities to regulate the 
local activities of cable systems.68  This gave local governments a measure of land use 
64. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 996 (“[T]he Commission remains free to impose special regulatory duties on 
facilities-based ISPs under Title I ancillary jurisdiction.”).
65. See 47 U.S.C. § 534 (2006).
66. See discussion supra p. 1051.
67. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
68. TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor, 396 U.S. 556 (1970) (per curiam).  The Court later held that the Cable Act 
authorized the FCC to prevent state or local governments from imposing upon cable operators any 
technical requirements more stringent than the FCC’s.  City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57 (1988). 
In addition, section 253 of the Communications Act states rather vaguely that the FCC may preempt 
any state or local law which would preempt the offering of a telecommunications service:
  (a) In general. No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal 
requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to 
provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service . . . . (d) If, after notice and 
an opportunity for public comment, the Commission determines that a State or local 
government has permitted or imposed any statute, regulation, or legal requirement that 
violates subsection (a) . . . the Commission shall preempt the enforcement of such statute, 
regulation, or legal requirement to the extent necessary to correct such violation or 
inconsistency.
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control over towers, pedestals, and the like.  More important, however, it gave them 
the authority to require the establishment of local franchises.  This in turn became a 
convenient basis for local governments to charge cable operators a fee for using public 
property—first the FCC69 and later Congress70 capped this fee at five percent of 
annual gross receipts.  This cap was essentially the result of a negotiated compromise 
between the National Cable Telecommunications Association and the National 
League of Cities.71
 After almost forty years of a healthy revenue f low from cable franchise fees, state 
and local governments naturally are not inclined to forego similar fees from FIOS or 
Lightspeed.  And there is no reason to; these media need public rights-of-ways as 
much as cable in order to lay their wires.  From the moment of their emergence, 
FIOS and Lightspeed were met with state and local demands for franchises—
including, of course, at least five percent franchise fees. 
 The problem for the new media was not so much the payments—which were 
anticipated—as the delay in negotiating literally thousands of separate franchise 
agreements.  This obviously would have been a major impediment to a quick rollout 
of the new technology.  The solution to this logjam, in many cases, was ultimately 
either the creation of state-wide franchises for both cable operators and FIOS/
Lightspeed or state requirements that local governments impose the same franchise 
terms on both industries—including franchise fees, access channels, and the like.  At 
present, more than half a dozen states have adopted one of these approaches.72
V. CONCLUSION
 FIOS/Lightspeed seems to be locked into a regulatory regime very similar to the 
first three decades of cable regulation.  As with cable regulation, Congress does not 
appear to be in a hurry to act.  After all, while FIOS/Lightspeed may be the newest 
entry in the media and telecommunications field, it has comparatively little 
importance in terms of broad national concerns ranging from war to economics. 
However, Congress may soon be forced to act.  While the reasonably ancillary 
doctrine created a limited presence for the federal government during cable’s 
interregnum, it does not seem applicable to FIOS/Lightspeed in any respect.
 Due in large part to the lack of federal intervention, states and local governments 
have been free to make their own rules—just as they did with cable from the 1950s 
to the 1980s.  As with the cable industry fifty years ago, this naturally may be a bit 
dysfunctional by creating different standards from one locale to another.  However, 
 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2006).  However, the Supreme Court largely ignored the statute in its only invocation 
to date.  See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004). 
69. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1984) (repealed by 50 Fed. Reg. 18637 (1985)).
70. 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (2006).
71. Michael Botein & Fredrik Cederqvist, The 1992 Cable Television Act, in 13 Encyclopedia of 
Telecommunications 411, 419 (Fritz E. Froehlich & Allen Kent eds., 1997).
72. Crandall, Sidak & Singer, supra note 7, at 256 n.21.  States that have passed legislation include Virginia, 
Texas, California, Indiana, Kansas, New Jersey, North Carolina, and South Carolina.  Id. 
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it may not be unfair to observe that cable survived this regulatory diaspora in good 
financial health, as should FIOS/Lightspeed—if their underlying technological and 
economic assumptions are correct.
 Moreover, it may be preferable to leave the federal issues in the hands of Congress. 
On a very general level, there may be some democratic value in taking time to build 
a consensus among competing industry groups, government, and the public.  Perhaps 
more important, these technologies are still new and untested.  Little is actually 
known about how they will function in long-term deployments—virtually no hard 
data exists as to the real capital expenditures, penetration rates, content, and 
maintenance.  Government intervention in this field has a less than impressive 
record, as seen by the corpses of regulatory regimes littering the history of cable. 
Thus, it may not be necessary for this new technology to be regulated.  If and when 
Congress, state and local governments, and administrative agencies move forward in 
attempting to regulate this technology, however, they would do well to heed the 
three decades worth of lessons that can be learned from the process of cable 
regulation.
